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THE FALLACY BEHIND THE INFLATED FLATS – WILL 
STANDARDIZING TERMS MAKE RESIDENTIAL-MARKET 
PRICES IN CHINA COLLAPSE? 
Tsui Tat Chee

 
Abstract 
In China, the price of residential property mainly depends on its 
size. But when calculating the property’s price, the Net Floor Area 
(NFA) is not used. Instead, China uses the Gross Floor Area (GFA), 
which the general public cannot easily calculate. Since the difference 
between the NFA and the GFA varies, many advocate using the NFA as 
the sole basis for calculating residential prices. In general, this would 
provide more reliable information to buyers. 
Real estate developers object to this proposal because the price of 
the properties may collapse if their NFA is far below their GFA. The 
author asserts that these arguments are invalid because buyers and 
sellers will adjust to the new standard even though the properties are 
traded in the second-hand market. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Based on oriental agricultural traditions, Chinese people view land 
and property as more than something that provides a living or serves as 
an investment. The price and quality of their homes serve as the primary 
indicator of peoples’ rank in society.  
Despite the decline in agrarian living since the government’s 
development of the manufacturing and service industries after the Open 
Door Policy in 1978, land properties still maintain their important 
function and act as a highly preferred investment product under the 
concept that “land is the source of all treasures.” This concept still 
dominates the values of the Chinese people.  
                                                     
 PhD Candidate, University of Dublin – Trinity College. 
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Current real estate customs adopted in China may cause buyers to 
feel confused, or even misled, when they enter into an important 
purchasing or investment transaction. For example, the price of 
residential properties in China is based on the Gross Floor Area (GFA). 
But this measure does not reflect the actual useful area of the flat, that is, 
the Net Floor Area (NFA). Under this policy, buyers receive a smaller 
flat whose proportion of usable floor area may be unknown because the 
difference between GFA and NFA is not standardized or completely 
defined. 
As it may not be easy for buyers to understand the actual usable 
area and compare the price of properties with different ratios of usable 
areas, it has been proposed that the NFA should be the standard measure 
for pricing. This would provide clear information for buyers to better 
understand the size of the flat they have purchased.  
Property owners, real estate developers, and real estate agents 
oppose this suggestion arguing that changing the price measurement 
may cause a sudden drop in second-hand properties. They assert that 
this will happen because using the NFA will lower prices on properties 
that were previously priced and sold using the GFA. Moreover, 
changing the pricing policies may confuse people who are accustomed 
to the pricing structure under the GFA guidelines, even though it does 
not reflect the true usable area. 
As legislation always lags behind policy, it is common for law 
makers to consider enhancing the standardization for the market after a 
problem occurs. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to provide an answer 
to the concerns stated above. Changing to the NFA will not cause 
market disorder for residential properties in China because they have 
special facets when they are still in the second-hand market. The paper 
also addresses why compulsory information disclosure is preferred in a 
market under circumstances of information asymmetry. In addition, this 
paper highlights the important function of foreign stakeholders in the 
market that should be considered when negotiating because the current 
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unwritten customs disadvantage foreign stakeholders. This paper 
provides an economic analysis of the suggestion for NFA pricing as 
proposed by the Hong Kong Institute of Architects. It focuses on the 
impacts on an existing market as it proposes new regulations for 
standardizing product descriptions and pricing. The suggestion at the 
end of the paper answers the concern that public areas excluded from 
NFA have value that may be ignored. 
This paper discusses the pricing policies of residential properties in 
mainland China and Hong Kong and a proposed change in the laws 
regulating those polices. Next, this paper discusses some of the fears of 
those opposed to the proposed change and an explanation of the theories 
underlying the fears and those underlying the proposed change. This 
paper finishes by explaining the need for making the proposed changes 
even though the market has already adapted to the difficulties under the 
current regime. 
II.  BACKGROUND ON PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE CHINESE REAL 
ESTATE PRICING SCHEME 
Residential-property prices in China are calculated from the total 
area of the flat and are based on two systems of measurement, the gross 
floor area, GFA, and the net floor area, NFA. This section defines these 
two systems of measurement and how they are used in mainland China 
and Hong Kong. It then analyzes the problems created by the current 
system and proposes a solution to those problems. Next, this section 
addresses the critics’ response to the solution, and concludes with a 
brief explanation of the possible effects of transitioning into the NFA 
pricing model.  
 A. GFA vs. NFA 
In China, the GFA is the standard pricing model used for residential 
properties. According to the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural 
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Development (MOHURD) of the People’s Republic of China, the GFA 
is determined based on the following formula: 
GFA = NFA + ½ Wall Area + Balcony Area + Public Area.
1
 
While the GFA represents the total possible area of the flat, the NFA 
reflects only the usable area. Note that the GFA in China only includes 
half of the external wall of the building.
2
 The underground area and the 
car parking space are excluded.
3
 In addition, the public area is 
proportionally allocated to the GFA of each flat.
4
 
In Hong Kong, where a special administrative region adopts its own 
laws independent of mainland China, there is not a GFA definition for 
individual flats but the GFA of a building is defined as follows: 
[T]he area contained within the external walls of the building 
measured at each floor level (including any floor below the 
level of the ground), together with the area of each balcony in 
the building, which shall be calculated from the overall 
dimensions of the balcony (including the thickness of the sides 
thereof), and the thickness of the external walls of the 
building.
5
 
B. Problems with the Current System 
Since the GFA measures total area rather than just usable area, this 
pricing model may harm the development of the real estate market in 
                                                     
1
 Jian she bu guan yu yin fa《Shang pin fang xiao shou mian ji ji suan ji gong yong jian zhu 
mian ji fen tan gui ze》(Shi xing) De tung zhi (建设部关于印发《商品房销售面积计算及公用建
筑面积分摊规则》（试行）的通知) [Gross Floor Area for Selling and Rules of Public Amortization 
(Trial Scheme) Notice], (promulgated by the Min. of Hous. and Urban-Rural Dev. [hereinafter 
MOHURD], Sept. 8, 1995, effective Dec. 1, 1995) MIN. OF HOUS. AND URBAN-RURAL DEV., 
Sept. 14, 2000, at art. 4, (China) available at http://219.142.101.122/zcfg/jswj/fdcy/200611/ 
t20061101_157411.htm. 
2
 Id. at art. 7. 
3
 Id. at art. 8. 
4
 Id. at art. 10–11. 
5
 Building (Planning) Regulations, (2005) BLIS Cap. 123F, reg. 23(3) (H.K.). 
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China because it creates an inconsistency in overall value of the 
property. For example, when the value of the non-exclusive public 
spaces (walls, balcony, lobby, corridor and elevator) are included in the 
GFA, properties with the same nominal area for pricing may have very 
different usable areas, which is the real value of the space and still be 
priced the same. 
Additionally, different NFA ratios make it more difficult to compare 
the true values of individual properties. In China, even though flats in 
the same development project adopt the same NFA ratio,
6
 buyers would 
still be unable to accurately compare the value of different 
developments with different NFA ratios.  
In Hong Kong, there are no regulations governing the proportion of 
public areas that can be allocated to the GFA of individual flats. Unlike 
mainland China, even property within the same development project 
may not use the same NFA to GFA ratio. For example, in the same 
property project the NFA/GFA ratio ranges from 28% to 43%.
7
 
In addition to the inconsistency in overall value of the flats, the 
GFA pricing model further widens the information barrier between 
developers and potential buyers who may receive far less usable area 
than they expect. For example, one may purchase a 1000 m² flat, only to 
find that the floor area is a mere 300 m² on settlement day.
8
 
This will force buyers to expend additional time and resources into 
researching the actual useable area of the property. Buyers also may not 
be able to recognize how the GFA of individual flats is calculated, or 
understand the primary basis of pricing even when the total area of the 
project is available. In addition, the GFA model could cause both 
                                                     
6
 MOHURD, supra note 1. 
7
 See infra Appendix 1. 
8
 See Pei-Lan Xin, Lou shu shi yong mian ji chang xiao shou mian ji dai ti (樓書「實用面積
」 倡「銷售面積」代替) [Adopt "Useable Area" Rather than "Salable Area" in Residential Selling 
Booklet], Hong Kong Economic Times, Mar. 22, 2007, at A26; see also Siji hao yuan 30% shi 
yong zui jing dian (四季豪園 30%實用最經典) [30% Usable Area Rate in Seasons Palace, the 
Most Extreme Case], APPLEDAILY (Hong Kong), May 5, 2007, at B02. 
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domestic and new foreign investors entering the Chinese or Hong Kong 
residential markets to lose confidence in the market since they may not 
understand why the actual area is less than what they expected based on 
the area for pricing. 
 In responding to this problem, the Hong Kong government 
continues to reform the regulations by standardizing the definition of 
salable area.
9
 The Hong Kong Estate Agents Authority also currently 
recommends that developers disclose all pertinent information.
10
 
Nonetheless, the current definition of the GFA remains the core problem 
because it still contains unregulated values for public areas.
11
 
C. The Proposed Solution to the Pricing Model Dilemma 
 The most effective method for solving customer 
misunderstandings regarding the size of the flat purchased and price 
incomparability among properties is to adopt a uniform standard of 
measurement. The Hong Kong Institute of Architects suggests that 
residential properties should be priced based on their NFA.
12
 
                                                     
9
 See Press Release, Hong Kong Government, Standardized Definition of "Saleable Area" 
for Uncompleted First-hand Residential Properties Takes Effect Today (Oct. 10, 2008), available at 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200810/10/P200810100152.htm. 
10
 Memorandum from the Real Estate Developers Association of Hong Kong to REDA 
Corporate Members (Oct. 10, 2008), available at 
http://www.eaa.org.hk/consumers/doc/20081010.pdf. 
11
 See jie ding bu qing “suo shui lou” lu re zheng ao (界定不清 「縮水樓」屢惹爭拗) 
[Ill-Defined ‘Shrink Floor’ Repeatedly Provoke Disputes], WEN WEI PO (June 18, 2008) (Hong 
Kong), http://paper.wenweipo.com/2008/06/18/HK0806180015.htm. As of March 2012, there were 
no Hong Kong regulations defining gross floor area for individual flats. See Bills Committee on 
Residential Properties (First-hand Sales) Bill: Background brief prepared for the meeting on 30 
March 2012, Legislative Council, LC Paper No. CB(1)  1445 /11-12(01) (H.K.), available at 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr11-12/ 
english/bc/bc04/papers/bc040330cb1-1445-1-e.pdf.  
12
 See Press Release, Hong Kong Institute of Architects, xin wen gao Xiang gang jian zhu 
shi xue hui dui fa shui lou wen ti ji zong lou mian mian ji kuan mian de yi jian (新聞稿:香港建築
師學會 對「發水樓」問題及總樓面面積寬免的意見) [The Hong Kong Institute of Architects’ 
Opinion on Inflated Flats and Exemption on Total Floor Area] (Oct. 12, 2010), available at 
http://www.hkia.net/en/News/action.do?mappingName=PressRelease&method=list. 
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 As a simple example, assume that a developer claims a property is 
1,000 m² GFA. At $1,000/m², the total price would equal $1 million. If 
the NFA, that is, the actual usable area, is 500 m² then the price per 
usable square-meter is $2000.
13
 
D. Criticism of the Proposed Solution 
 Although the proposed NFA pricing model could resolve potential 
misunderstandings regarding actual value, property owners, developers, 
and real estate agents object to this proposal stating that: 
 a new pricing system may cause the prices of existing 
properties to suddenly drop,
14
 
 buyers who have become accustomed to the current 
pricing system may be confused by the change,
15
 and 
 the public area should not be excluded from estimating the 
property price since it also creates use value for 
residents.
16
 
E. How the Remainder of the Paper Will Evaluate the Proposed 
Solution 
 This paper focuses on the effect of transitioning from GFA pricing 
to NFA pricing in the case of second-hand residential property in Hong 
                                                     
13
 Price per usable m2 = (GFA x Price Per m2)/NFA = (1,000 m2 x $1,000) / 500 m2 = $2,000. 
With 500 m2 multiplied by $2,000 / m2, the total cost would still be $1 million. 
14 
Shi yong mian ji ji lou jia ye zhu you die jia liang cheng (實用面積計樓價 業主憂跌價
兩成) [Property Owners Worry 20% Price Drop when Using Usable Floor Area for Pricing], THE 
HONG KONG HEADLINES (Oct. 15, 2010), http://news.hkheadline.com/dailynews/content_hk/ 
2010/10/15/126109.asp. 
15
 See Shih Wing Ching, Shi yong mian ji ji jia bu yi tui xing (實用面積計價不易推
行) [Hardship of Net Floor Area Pricing], MY SINA BLOG (Oct. 20, 2010), http://shihwingching. 
mysinablog.com/index.php?op=ViewArticle&articleId=2648819.  Shih Wing Ching is the 
co-founder of Centaline Property Agency, Ltd. 
16
 See Shih Wing Ching, Mai lou bu neng zhi kan shi nei mian ji (買樓不能只 看室內面
積 ) [Net Floor Area Shall Not Be the Sole Factor for Pricing], MY SINA BLOG (Oct. 20, 
2010), http://shihwingching.mysinablog.com/ index.php?op=ViewArticle&articleId=2650976. 
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Kong. Goods in the first-hand market will not be affected by a new 
regulation being enforced, while second-hand products will be traded on 
the market before and after the regulation. Thus, they will be evaluated 
and priced by two different standards of measurement. 
 Residential properties are highly affected by policy changes 
because their duration of trading is relatively long, i.e., 50 years, which 
is the minimum age before a property is subject to compulsory sale for 
redevelopment in Hong Kong.
17
 This age may provide a reference for 
the useful life of residential properties from a legal point of view. The 
long duration of trading makes residential properties a good example for 
determining the effects of regulation changes in the market. 
 To analyze the effect of transitioning from GFA to NFA, Hong 
Kong is preferred to mainland China, as a case study, for two main 
reasons. First, other than the common problem that the GFA pricing 
does not reflect the actual usable area for the residents, the proportion 
between the GFA and the NFA in China is well-governed, while 
regulations in Hong Kong are much less clear.
18
 A test that provides an 
answer to the situation in Hong Kong will more effectively explain the 
complexities of the issue. Second, the findings will prove valuable when 
the legislators in Hong Kong are reviewing possible reforms to the laws 
regulating residential-property sales in order to guarantee that customers 
obtain sufficient information. 
III.  THE ECONOMIC THEORIES UNDERLYING THE CRITICS’ FEARS 
In essence, the problem of GFA pricing can be understood as an 
information barrier. The area customers pay for, as claimed by 
developers, does not reflect the actual usable area. This creates a barrier 
when buyers access information about residential properties from sellers. 
The developer, the party who designs and builds the property, will know 
                                                     
17
 Land (Compulsory Sale for Redevelopment) (Specification of Lower Percentage) Notice, 
(2010) BLIS Cap. 545A, 1, § 3 (H.K.). 
18
 See supra Part II.B. 
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these details about the property. The purchaser, on the other hand, may 
not have access to this information if the developer does not disclose it 
or if the purchaser does not conduct an in-depth search. As a result, an 
asymmetrical information difference is created between the seller and 
the buyer. 
When information about the quality of goods available to both 
parties is different, such as the NFA/GFA ratio in residential properties 
in China, analogizing to George Akerlof’s lemon market model may be 
fitting. This analogy serves as a good starting point for considering the 
information asymmetry in the market before deciding whether a new 
standardized term, NFA pricing, should be implemented. 
A. Akerlof’s Lemon Market Model 
In the lemon market model, George Akerlof concluded that the 
market may collapse when the information that buyers and sellers have 
access to is asymmetrical and the quality of the goods is uncertain. In a 
market where there are quality used cars and defective used cars 
(lemons), the model assumes that sellers understand the quality of the 
cars they sell, and that buyers cannot distinguish between quality cars 
and lemons. 
Under this model, when buyers are not able to differentiate the 
quality of the cars available on the market, they are willing to pay the 
price for cars of average quality. On the other hand, sellers will decide 
to only offer cars of low quality because they are not willing to accept 
average payment for an above average car. Thus, buyers pay the price 
for average quality cars but receive lemons. As above average cars are 
removed from the used-car market, the average quality of cars declines. 
Despite this trend, sellers may gain a short-term advantage by 
receiving prices for average quality cars even when selling lower 
quality cars. But in the long run buyers lower their expectations and 
reduce their offers. Owners of average quality cars will no longer sell, 
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and the market eventually fails because sellers are no longer willing to 
sell. 
When George Akerlof received the Nobel Prize in economics, he 
stated in his acceptance speech that his paper on the lemon market was 
rejected three times.
19
 A third round reviewer of the paper raised an 
interesting argument against Akerlof’s conclusion saying that, “after all, 
eggs of different grades were sorted and sold (I do not believe that this 
is just my memory confusing it with my original perception of the 
egg-grader model), as were other agricultural commodities. If this paper 
was correct, then no goods could be traded (an exaggeration of the 
claims of the paper).”20 While the reviewer’s point may seem logically 
sound, the market does not actually collapse when Akerlof’s logic is 
applied to the Hong Kong residential-property market. 
B. Gresham’s Law 
Akerlof’s analysis is one way of understanding human behaviors 
and market outcomes under Gresham's law.
21
 But Akerlof’s analysis 
may not be in complete agreement with the original idea of Thomas 
Gresham. Gresham stated that when dealing with the situation described 
by Akerlof, “both [the] buyer and seller can tell the difference between 
good and bad money.”22 
As mentioned in the previous section, buyers may not lack the 
knowledge required for Akerlof’s model to hold true in the Chinese 
residential markets. This is because it is possible for buyers to search for 
any information the sellers do not provide. When buyers search for 
                                                     
19
 George A. Akerlof, Writing the “The Market for ‘Lemons’”: A Personal and Interpretive 
Essay, NOBEL PRIZE (Nov. 14, 2003), http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/ 
2001/akerlof-article.html. 
20
 Id. 
21
George A. Akerlof, The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 489-90 (1970). 
22
 Id. at 490. 
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information, the result is no trading in the market. Thus, the inference 
made by the reviewer of Akerlof’s paper does not occur. 
The conclusion of Gresham’s Law is no longer applicable in the real 
world. As in Gresham’s model, when “good” and “bad” money exist in 
the market, people are only willing to use the “bad” money and hold the 
“good” money. Such a choice in today’s world would cause “good” 
money to disappear in the market, and only “bad” money would be left 
to use.
23
 
C. The Problem with Using the Lemon Market or Gresham’s 
Model 
In terms of logic, neither Akerlof nor the reviewer of his paper is 
wrong. It is a reasonable reaction for sellers in Akerlof’s lemon market 
to offer cars of low quality when (1) buyers are not able to access the 
cars’ quality before the transaction, and (2) sellers request a fixed 
amount (the price for cars of average quality) in order to maximize their 
profits. 
The collapse of the lemon market does not occur in a predictable 
fashion. A market collapse will only result if buyers and sellers act in 
accordance with Akerlof’s model. If the market still exists, and 
Akerlof’s logic is correct, then how can Akerlof and the reviewer both 
be correct? 
The reason may be that Akerlof’s model only represents the most 
extreme circumstance. If buyers do not have any information about the 
goods they buy, market failure may be the inevitable outcome. But this 
situation is not realistic for buyers purchasing real estate. Buying real 
estate is one of the most important investments in a person’s life. Even 
though the buyer may not search for all the information the buyer lacks, 
such as the true usable area of the residential property, the buyer still 
                                                     
23
 STEVEN N. S. CHEUNG, Zhong guo de qian tu (中國的前途) [CHINA’S PROSPECT] 59 
(Hong Kong Economic Journal Press, 10th ed. 1996). Steven Cheung also discusses the same ideas 
on his blog http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_47841af7010003w8.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2012). 
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obtains some additional information about the property. Thus, the 
outcome would go against Akerlof’s model and the reviewer’s 
conclusion. 
IV.  ECONOMIC THEORIES UNDERLYING SUPPORT OF THE PROPOSED 
CHANGES 
When buyers seek information on their own they consider how to 
adjust their behavior and what the result of these adjustments may be. 
However, Steven Cheung, who examined the “Twin-Dollar System” of 
China in the 1980s and 1990s, rebutted this conclusion. Cheung’s 
observations will serve as a starting point to understand whether the 
Chinese residential-property markets can handle a new regulation to 
standardize the NFA pricing policy. 
A. China’s Twin-Dollar System 
Between 1980 and 1995 people used two types of currency in China: 
the Renminbi (RMB) and the Foreign Exchange Certificate (FEC). The 
RMB was the ordinary currency of the Chinese people. The FEC, on the 
other hand, was only available to foreign visitors entering mainland 
China. The FEC was highly flexible because it could be exchanged for 
foreign currencies and could also be taken out of the country.
24
 The 
RMB could not be exchanged or taken out of China.
25
 Some of the 
more exclusive retailers and restaurants accepted only the FEC, making 
the FEC essential to enjoy luxury products and services.
26
 Despite the 
fact that the FEC was more desired the official exchange rate between 
the FEC and RMB remained 1-to-1.
27
 
Under Gresham’s analysis, the FEC would be classified as “good” 
money and the RMB as “bad” money. In Gresham’s original idea, when 
                                                     
24
 Id. at 57. 
25
 Id. 
26
 Id. at 61.  
27
 Id. at 57. 
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both “good” and “bad” money have the same face value, a reasonable 
person would hold the “good” money (the FEC) and only spend the 
“bad” money (the RMB) to maintain a higher in-hand value. If 
Gresham’s law held true, the FEC would have eventually disappeared 
from the market because people would not want to spend their “good” 
money. But this was not the case. So why did the FEC continue to 
circulate? Cheung suggested that buyers were willing to pay in “bad” 
money, but sellers were not necessarily willing to accept it. If sellers did 
not want to accept RMB, either people paying in “bad” money would 
have to pay a premium to compensate for paying in RMB, or sellers 
would have to offer a discount to buyers paying in FEC, or “good” 
money, until equilibrium was achieved to make a transaction possible.
28
 
By late 1984, the difference in substantive value caused the 
exchange rate between the two currencies in the black market to reach 
1-to-1.8.
29
 As a result, Chinese people would rarely exchange FEC for 
RMB when they received FEC from a foreigner, even though 
regulations required them to do so.
30
 In the interest of competing with 
the black market, some government-owned hotels began offering 30% 
to 50% discounts to customers paying with the FEC.
31
 Still, this was 
not as advantageous as the 80% discounts being offered in the black 
market.
32
  
Cheung posited that the Chinese government adopted the FEC as a 
second currency for foreigners’ use because it would result in additional 
economic gains for China as long as foreigners did not exchange it at a 
lower rate on the black market.
33
 Information and transaction costs 
were pre-conditions of such gains because they would only occur if 
                                                     
28
 Id. at 59. 
29
 Id. at 57. The original text stated that 100 Hong Kong Dollars were equal to 35 RMB or 
63 FEC. 
30
 Id. at 58. 
31
 Id. 
32
 Id. 
33
 Id. at 60-62. 
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foreigners exchanged in official ways. When foreigners realized they 
could obtain a better exchange rate in the black market, these gains 
ceased. 
Cheung’s 1985 analysis thus solved the paradox of Akerlof’s speech 
in 2001. When Akerlof’s model is taken to the extreme, sellers only 
offer low quality cars because buyers pay a given price without 
knowing the quality of the goods. As a result, buyers no longer want to 
pay the price for average quality if they cannot examine the goods 
before the transaction. The reviewer’s conclusion that no goods would 
be traded under these circumstances may be logically true. However, in 
reality buyers would have some knowledge of the goods they intended 
to purchase even if the sellers did not provide it, just as foreign buyers 
of Chinese currencies were able to obtain information about the 
exchange rate of the FEC and the RMB on the black market, even 
though it was not available through official channels. The condition 
Cheung listed—that buyers might obtain information by themselves 
after paying reasonable information and transaction costs—provided an 
answer as to why Akerlof’s and the reviewer’s logic did not hold. 
Simply put, the model did not result in unaffordable costs to prevent 
buyers from accessing information about the quality of goods. 
Cheung’s answer to Gresham’s law provides a framework for 
legislating the transition to standardized terms for Chinese and Hong 
Kong residential-property pricing. This framework is especially 
illuminating with respect to whether or not new standardized terms will 
cause confusion in the second-hand market. If everyone exchanges the 
RMB for the FEC under the official rate (1-to-1), the price of 1 FEC 
will be 1 RMB resulting in equilibrium at E1 in Figure 1. For people 
who recognize that they can obtain a better exchange rate in the black 
market—where the price of 1 FEC would be 1.8 RMB—the equilibrium 
would be E2. 
Under this model, when some people are not aware that the black 
market offers a better rate or that competing government-owned 
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companies offer similar rates, not all exchange transactions will be 
completed at the black-market rate E2, even though the black-market 
rate is the equilibrium that buyers and sellers are willing to accept for 
the difference in quality between the FEC and the RMB. Thus, market 
equilibrium will neither occur at the official rate of 1 RMB, nor occur at 
the black-market rate of 1.8 RMB because neither the official channel 
nor the black market will have a monopoly on customers desiring to 
exchange FEC. Instead, most people will exchange their FEC at some 
point between these two, resulting in a 1.5 RMB exchange rate, the 
semi-official rate offered by government-owned companies. This new 
rate results from the competition between the government and the black 
market, creating a new equilibrium, E3 in Figure 2. E3 is even closer to 
whole market equilibrium than E1 or E2 because it represents the result 
of these two extreme situations. 
At E2, 1.8 RMB is the equilibrium that buyers and sellers want. E1, 
the official rate, transfers part of the surplus from foreigners who buy 
Chinese currency. The surplus (a), or the additional gain recognized by 
Cheung, occurs when people obtain 1 RMB with 1 FEC.
34
 However, 
the higher price of Chinese currency under the official rate results in 
higher costs, which discourages foreigners’ consumption in China. This 
decreases the amount of money exchanged by foreigners. Thus, (b) 
becomes the surplus China loses when foreigners obtain less Chinese 
currency at a higher rate, and (d) is the deadweight loss due to the 
Twin-Dollar System. The loss is seen when foreigners pay a higher 
price for Chinese currency, but part of the difference is lost in 
transaction fees rather than a transfer to the Chinese government. 
Essentially, the exchange rate difference results in an indirect tax on 
the exchange of currency by foreigners.
35
 Consequently, foreigners will 
                                                     
34
 Id. 
35
 The effect of the Twin-Dollar System is similar to that of a tax but with the difference that 
the Chinese government acts both as tax collector and currency seller. For an example of the 
original model of the tax effect, see ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, 
MICROECONOMICS 336 (Prentice Hall, 7th ed. 2009). 
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lose if they do not obtain a desirable price in the black market. The net 
gain or loss depends on the elasticity of foreigners’ demand. 36 
Conversely, when people exchange through both official channels and 
on the black market, the semi-official market rate releases part of the 
deadweight loss, and the government gains from the Twin-Dollar Policy. 
The net effect of the black market thus simulates a tax rate reduction 
because it forces the government to offer the semi-official rate to reduce 
its deadweight loss. 
 
Figure 1 – The Higher Rate Charged by the Government Is a Form 
of Indirect Tax 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                     
36
 CHEUNG, supra note 23, at 60-62. 
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Figure 2 – The Black Market Offsets Part of the Government’s Gain 
and Deadweight Loss  
 
B. “Adjusted-Already” Price 
To some extent, China’s residential-property markets are similar to 
its Twin-Dollar System. But the result may be different. The GFA 
standard for pricing inflates the value of the property. Buyers who do 
not recognize the GFA’s inflationary effect may pay more because they 
fail to understand that they are receiving far less area than they expect. 
This is similar to the Twin-Dollar System when people did not realize 
they could obtain a better rate on the black market. As Figure 3 
indicates, if buyers do not recognize that the inflated usable area using 
GFA is much less than the NFA, sellers have an advantage. But in 
contrast to the black market for Chinese currency where not all people 
were aware of the alternative exchange rate, it is unlikely that this is the 
case in the residential-property market. 
First, compared to the black market where information was 
unavailable through public channels because it was illegal, examining 
the actual area of a flat by a buyer is completely reasonable and legal. 
Second, there is a fundamental difference in attitude between foreigners 
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visiting China and individuals considering the purchase of real property. 
It is difficult to justify the presumption that buyers do not take 
reasonable steps to examine such an important investment, especially 
considering that they may spend up to 60% of their income on the 
mortgage.
37
 
In addition, the result would be completely different from that of the 
Twin-Dollar System if buyers in the real estate market did not merely 
rely on the GFA information offered by the sellers. If buyers were to 
calculate the NFA and examine all of the extra public area included in 
the GFA, buyers could assign value to the extra space to determine the 
price they would be willing to pay because it would tell them the true 
value they would receive from the property. 
Returning to the simple example used earlier,
38
 if the buyer 
recognizes that the actual area of the flat is 500 m² as measured in NFA 
instead of the 1,000 m² measured by the inflated GFA, the buyer can 
then determine if $1 million is a fair price to pay for a 500 m² flat rather 
than a 1,000 m² flat. Assuming that this situation represents reality, even 
if the inflated GFA draws the equilibrium to E2 in Figure 3, the buyers’ 
search for information would push the equilibrium back to E1 as they 
would have to obtain the true area, the NFA, by themselves. In short, the 
inflationary effect of GFA pricing does not matter when buyers adjust 
the area’s true value per square-meter according to the NFA. 
The analysis becomes even more interesting upon realizing that the 
primary concern for the seller—that the price of properties in the 
second-hand market might collapse upon changing from GFA-based 
pricing to NFA-based pricing
39— will not occur. Buyers are likely to 
examine the quality of the goods that they spend 60% of their income 
on, unless they do not recognize the difference between the two floor 
                                                     
37
 Mei Lian: Gong lou fu dan lu shi ji da liu cheng (美聯：供樓負擔率實際達六成) 
[Midland Realty: The Real Rate of Mortgage Burden on Income Reaches 60%], THE SUN (March 8, 
2011), http://the-sun.on.cc/cnt/finance/20110308/00434_005.html. 
38
 See supra note 13. 
39
 See supra Part II.D. 
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areas. The other argument, that buyers have become accustomed to the 
inflated GFA pricing,
40
 rebuts the possibility that buyers do not know 
the difference between the two meanings of “area.” 
 
Figure 3 – The Demand Curve Goes Back to Original When Buyers 
Conduct Their Own Search for Information 
 
C. Summary of the Twin-Dollar and Adjusted-Already Theories 
Because there is an information gap that can be filled in the 
residential market, the double currency is useful in coming to an 
understanding about the perceived and actual problems of the proposed 
change. Since purchasers have access to extra information already in the 
residential market, the prices for flats using the GFA pricing model are 
likely priced to include the public areas. This means that by changing 
from GFA to NFA will likely cause very little change in prices, since the 
purchasers have already priced the flats knowing the actual usable area. 
Thus, a property selling for $1 million will likely still sell for one 
million, and the only change will be in the multiple used to get there. 
  
                                                     
40
 See supra Part II.D. 
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V.  WHY LEGISLATE IF THE PRICE IS ALREADY ADJUSTED 
After responding to the first two objections to NFA pricing, a 
possible inference is that the policy enhances the price by providing 
information about the true value of the residential properties. But two 
questions remain:  
1. If buyers themselves have already adjusted the price they are 
willing to pay, why change the law? 
2. Because the public area also provides a certain value to residents, 
though perhaps not equivalent to that of private area, how is the 
value of the public area incorporated? 
A. Long-Term Cost Savings 
In response to the first question, why change to NFA if buyers have 
already adjusted to GFA pricing because buyers are able to search for 
the true information by themselves, it is much more cost effective and 
efficient to adopt NFA pricing. When buyers discover the true area of 
the private area and the components of the public area, they must verify 
the information at the flat or calculate it from the floor plan. Under NFA 
pricing, the data will be available from developers as designers of the 
property. Put simply, social waste occurs if buyers must duplicate the 
work already performed by the developers. 
While a possible objection to NFA pricing includes the excessive 
cost of providing buyers with additional information, NFA pricing 
passes muster even under a cost-benefit analysis. As previously 
discussed, this system not only saves buyers the cost of researching the 
true area of the flat, but it also mitigates misunderstandings for those 
who do not know that the GFA does not reflect the actual usable space. 
Specifically, the NFA serves to protect foreign investors since they are 
more likely than domestic residents to be misled by the GFA model. If 
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foreign investors have greater confidence in the Chinese 
residential-property market, they may be more inclined to invest in it. 
Furthermore, a standard NFA pricing model enhances comparability 
among properties because unlike the GFA, which uses different rates, 
buyers would not have to recalculate the value of the real property. 
Compared to the benefits, the overall costs of changing to the new 
NFA pricing system are relatively negligible. For new first-hand 
properties, there is no additional cost since developers will already have 
all of the pertinent information when they design the buildings. The 
information cost for properties for which the NFA is already available is 
zero, while there may be a one-time evaluation cost for properties if the 
NFA is unknown and it is traded in the second-hand market. This 
one-time evaluation cost is a sunk cost because evaluating the NFA of 
the flat is already required of new buyers. For old properties, not only is 
there no additional cost, but there is an actual benefit since NFA pricing 
ensures that this information is available when the property is traded for 
a second time on the market. 
The Hong Kong government has enforced the first step toward 
creating a more buyer-friendly market. As of 2008,
41
 when selling 
unfinished first-hand residential properties, developers must disclose the 
NFA, and they are required to offer on-site model units as of 2010.
42
 
But this is far from enough. While the law would lower the evaluation 
cost for buyers in the first-hand residential-property market, it would 
have no influence on properties sold before 2008. It also would not 
improve the problems of incomparability between different projects.  
                                                     
41
 Press Release, Hong Kong Government, Zhuzhai shiyong mianji dingyi shengxiao (住宅
實用面積定義生效) [Definition of Net Floor Area for Residential Properties Comes into Force] 
(Oct. 10, 2008), http://archive.news.gov.hk/isd/ebulletin/tc/category/infrastructureandlogistics/ 
081010/html/081010tc06002.htm. 
42
 Press Release, Hong Kong Government, Legislative Council: Speech by Financial 
Secretary on Second Reading Debate on Appropriation Bill 2010 (Apr. 21, 2010), 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201004/21/P201004210173.htm. 
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Furthermore, the second-hand market would not collapse, as posited 
by those opposed to NFA pricing, because buyers would search for the 
true information themselves. But what if, although unlikely, foreigners 
were to buy property unaware that the total price-per-area they paid for 
was inflated and the actual space purchased is much less than expected? 
If buyers do not know that the area of the GFA is not the true usable 
area, the price of second-hand market property may drop slightly as the 
critics predict.
43
 But it will not result in a price collapse because this 
naïve group will not be the majority of purchasers. Even the seller side 
has agreed that most people are already familiar with this practice, and 
it is wrong to assume that investors would not examine the quality of 
goods before spending sixty percent of their income.
44
 Still, NFA 
pricing should not be implemented to provide more reliable information 
to this type of investor, but rather to protect those investors who have 
less knowledge due to information asymmetry. 
B. The Value of the Public Area 
Although the NFA model passes muster under the cost-benefit 
analysis, unfortunately it may not directly resolve the question of how 
to adequately value the public area of a residential property because 
public area is composed of various components with varying functions 
and characteristics. It is also not fair to regard public area as equal in 
value to the private area under the GFA pricing. A possible solution to 
assessing the value of public space is to provide the NFA plus a 
disclosure of the price breakdown of additional components, thus 
allowing customers to determine how much they are willing to pay for 
each component. 
                                                     
43
 See supra Part II.D. 
44
 See supra Part IV.B. 
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In short, NFA pricing with compulsory disclosure would not induce 
additional information or transaction costs, but would instead result in 
net social gains in the long term. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
China should move from pricing flats from using the GFA to the 
NFA. The question addressed in this paper is not limited to the problem 
of the residential market in China and the information barriers 
encountered by foreign investors who enter into a market with unspoken 
rules. More importantly, the study discussed in this paper examines how 
a new regulation can standardize contract terms and mitigate market 
disarray, even when goods are traded in a second-hand market. 
The fears of those opposed to the proposed pricing change are 
unfounded. As described in the Lemon-Market theory, if there was no 
possible way for a purchaser to obtain information about the product 
they purchase, then it is possible for the market to collapse. But as seen 
in the analysis of the Twin-Dollar and Adjusted-Already theories, 
information is almost never completely restricted. For this reason, the 
latter two theories better explain what will happen to the market if 
China changes its pricing policies. In reality, the market has already 
accounted for the pricing difficulties and is evident in the price 
purchasers are willing to pay under the current regime. 
Even though the market has already accounted for the difficulties of 
pricing, the governments in mainland China and Hong Kong should still 
adopt the changes in order to create a more stable environment for 
foreign investors and to decrease the overall cost. Foreign investors 
need to be protected because they do not have the easy access to extra 
information like Chinese nationals. By changing the law to one standard 
for NFA, accurate information about the usable floor area will be 
available to everyone and the cost to get that information will decrease. 
The overall transactional cost will decrease because the NFA needs to 
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be calculated and posted only once instead of each individual buyer 
having to break down the GFA into its components to determine NFA 
before buying. 
For these reasons, mainland China and Hong Kong should change 
to NFA pricing instead of the GFA variations they currently use.
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Appendix 1 
An Example of Area Breakdown of 
A Resident Property Project in Hong Kong (in ft²)
45
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1 A1 2,590 2,373 1,092 61 356 135 221 426 499 42.16 39.81 
2 A2 2,562 2,346 1,083 61 349 135 214 423 491 42.27 39.89 
3 A2 2,561 2,345 1,083 61 349 135 214 422 491 42.29 39.91 
5 A1 2,594 2,376 1,092 61 356 135 221 429 499 42.10 39.75 
6 A1 2,591 2,374 1,092 61 356 135 221 427 499 42.15 39.79 
7 A2 2,552 2,337 1,083 61 349 135 214 414 491 42.44 40.05 
8 A2 2,548 2,333 1,083 61 349 135 214 410 491 42.50 40.11 
9 A2 2,544 2,329 1,083 61 349 135 214 406 491 42.57 40.17 
10 A2 2,540 2,325 1,083 61 349 135 214 402 491 42.64 40.24 
11 A1 2,572 2,355 1,092 61 356 135 221 408 499 42.46 40.09 
12 A1 2,590 2,373 1,092 61 356 135 221 426 499 42.16 39.81 
15 A2 2,587 2,371 1,083 61 349 135 214 448 491 41.86 39.51 
16 A2 2,616 2,400 1,083 61 349 135 214 477 491 41.40 39.07 
17 A1 2,711 2,495 1,092 61 356 135 221 548 499 40.28 38.03 
18 A1 2,704 2,490 1,087 54 356 135 221 548 499 40.20 38.20 
19 A2 2,660 2,445 1,083 61 349 135 214 522 491 40.71 38.42 
                                                     
45
 Excerpt taken from Seasons Palace, MIDLAND REALTY (Oct. 14, 2009), 
http://app.midland.com.hk/residential_ebook/%A5%7C%A9u%BB%A8%B6%E9-seasons-palace. 
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20 A2 2,761 2,545 1,083 61 349 135 214 622 491 39.22 37.02 
21 A2 2,931 2,716 1,083 61 349 135 214 793 491 36.95 34.87 
22 A2 3,101 2,886 1,083 61 349 135 214 963 491 34.92 32.96 
23 A2 3,272 3,056 1,083 61 349 135 214 1,133 491 33.10 31.23 
25 A2 3,431 3,215 1,083 61 349 135 214 1,292 491 31.57 29.79 
26 A1 3,642 3,425 1,092 61 356 135 221 1,478 499 29.98 28.31 
27 A1 3,191 2,974 1,092 61 356 135 221 1,027 499 34.22 32.31 
28 A2 2,998 2,782 1,083 61 349 135 214 859 491 36.12 34.09 
29 A2 2,850 2,634 1,083 61 349 135 214 711 491 38.00 35.86 
30 A2 2,767 2,551 1,083 61 349 135 214 628 491 39.14 36.94 
31 A2 2,737 2,520 1,083 61 349 135 214 597 491 39.57 37.34 
32 A2 2,706 2,490 1,083 61 349 135 214 567 491 40.02 37.77 
33 A2 2,666 2,450 1,083 61 349 135 214 527 491 40.62 38.33 
35 A1 2,650 2,433 1,092 61 356 135 221 486 499 41.21 38.91 
36 A3 2,821 2,605 1,096 61 349 135 214 663 497 38.85 36.69 
37 A2 2,877 2,662 1,083 61 349 135 214 739 491 37.64 35.52 
38 A2 2,994 2,778 1,083 61 349 135 214 855 491 36.17 34.13 
39 A2 3,119 2,903 1,083 61 349 135 214 980 491 34.72 32.77 
50 A2 3,180 2,964 1,083 61 349 135 214 1,041 491 34.06 32.14 
51 A2 3,180 2,964 1,083 61 349 135 214 1,041 491 34.06 32.14 
52 A1 3,486 3,271 1,085 54 356 135 221 1,331 499 31.12 29.58 
53 A1 2,810 2,596 1,087 54 356 135 221 654 499 38.68 36.76 
55 A2 2,789 2,574 1,083 61 349 135 214 651 491 38.83 36.64 
56 A2 3,452 3,236 1,083 61 349 135 214 1,313 491 31.37 29.61 
57 A1 3,456 3,239 1,092 61 356 135 221 1,292 499 31.60 29.83 
58 A1 3,552 3,335 1,092 61 356 135 221 1,388 499 30.74 29.03 
59 A2 3,601 3,385 1,083 61 349 135 214 1,462 491 30.07 28.38 
60 A2 3,700 3,484 1,083 61 349 135 214 1,561 491 29.27 27.62 
61 A2 3,798 3,582 1,083 61 349 135 214 1,659 491 28.52 26.91 
62 A2 3,775 3,559 1,083 61 349 135 214 1,636 491 28.69 27.07 
63 A2 3,429 3,213 1,083 61 349 135 214 1,290 491 31.58 29.80 
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65 A3 3,050 2,833 1,096 61 349 135 214 891 497 35.93 33.93 
66 A1 2,774 2,559 1,085 54 356 135 221 619 499 39.11 37.17 
67 A2 3,318 3,102 1,083 61 349 135 214 1,179 491 32.64 30.80 
68 A2 3,274 3,058 1,083 61 349 135 214 1,135 491 33.08 31.22 
69 A2 3,203 2,987 1,083 61 349 135 214 1,064 491 33.81 31.91 
70 A2 3,132 2,916 1,083 61 349 135 214 993 491 34.58 32.63 
71 A2 3,074 2,858 1,083 61 349 135 214 935 491 35.23 33.25 
72 A2 2,519 2,303 1,083 61 349 135 214 380 491 42.99 40.57 
73 A1 2,560 2,342 1,092 61 356 135 221 395 499 42.66 40.27 
75 A1 2,567 2,349 1,092 61 356 135 221 402 499 42.54 40.16 
76 A2 2,543 2,326 1,083 61 349 135 214 403 491 42.59 40.19 
77 A2 2,608 2,392 1,083 61 349 135 214 469 491 41.53 39.19 
78 A2 2,674 2,458 1,083 61 349 135 214 535 491 40.50 38.22 
79 A2 2,630 2,414 1,083 61 349 135 214 491 491 41.18 38.86 
80 A1 2,597 2,379 1,092 61 356 135 221 432 499 42.05 39.70 
81 A1 2,597 2,380 1,092 61 356 135 221 433 499 42.05 39.70 
82 A2 2,620 2,403 1,083 61 349 135 214 480 491 41.34 39.01 
83 A2 2,679 2,463 1,083 61 349 135 214 540 491 40.43 38.15 
85 A2 2,668 2,452 1,083 61 349 135 214 529 491 40.59 38.31 
86 A2 2,613 2,397 1,083 61 349 135 214 474 491 41.45 39.11 
87 A1 3,313 3,095 1,092 61 356 135 221 1,148 499 32.96 31.12 
88 A1 2,700 2,482 1,092 61 356 135 221 535 499 40.44 38.19 
89 A2 2,616 2,400 1,083 61 349 135 214 477 491 41.40 39.07 
90 A2 2,608 2,392 1,083 61 349 135 214 469 491 41.53 39.19 
91 A2 2,608 2,392 1,083 61 349 135 214 469 491 41.53 39.19 
92 A2 2,608 2,392 1,083 61 349 135 214 469 491 41.53 39.19 
93 A1 2,627 2,410 1,092 61 356 135 221 463 499 41.57 39.25 
95 A1 3,139 2,923 1,092 61 356 135 221 976 499 34.79 32.84 
96 A2 2,563 2,347 1,083 61 349 135 214 424 491 42.26 39.88 
97 A2 2,563 2,347 1,083 61 349 135 214 424 491 42.26 39.88 
98 A2 2,563 2,347 1,083 61 349 135 214 424 491 42.26 39.88 
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99 A2 2,563 2,347 1,083 61 349 135 214 424 491 42.26 39.88 
100 A2 2,563 2,347 1,083 61 349 135 214 424 491 42.26 39.88 
101 A2 2,563 2,347 1,083 61 349 135 214 424 491 42.26 39.88 
102 A1 2,596 2,379 1,092 61 356 135 221 432 499 42.06 39.71 
103 A1 2,814 2,597 1,092 61 356 135 221 650 499 38.81 36.64 
105 A2 2,782 2,567 1,083 61 349 135 214 644 491 38.93 36.74 
106 A2 2,782 2,567 1,083 61 349 135 214 644 491 38.93 36.74 
107 A2 2,788 2,572 1,083 61 349 135 214 649 491 38.85 36.66 
108 A3 3,226 3,010 1,096 61 349 135 214 1,068 497 33.97 32.08 
109 A1 3,352 3,137 1,092 61 356 135 221 1,190 499 32.58 30.76 
110 A1 2,976 2,759 1,092 61 356 135 221 812 499 36.69 34.64 
111 A1 2,699 2,481 1,092 61 356 135 221 534 499 40.46 38.20 
112 A2 2,920 2,704 1,083 61 349 135 214 781 491 37.09 35.00 
113 A2 2,827 2,611 1,083 61 349 135 214 688 491 38.31 36.15 
115 A1 3,149 2,932 1,092 60 356 135 221 985 499 34.68 32.77 
116 A1 2,819 2,603 1,091 60 356 135 221 657 499 38.70 36.57 
117 A2 2,664 2,448 1,083 61 349 135 214 525 491 40.65 38.36 
118 A3 2,580 2,363 1,096 61 349 135 214 421 497 42.48 40.12 
119 A1 2,490 2,272 1,092 61 356 135 221 325 499 43.86 41.41 
120 A2 2,463 2,247 1,083 61 349 135 214 324 491 43.97 41.49 
121 A2 2,544 2,328 1,083 61 349 135 214 405 491 42.57 40.17 
122 A1 2,727 2,509 1,092 61 356 135 221 562 499 40.04 37.81 
123 A1 2,680 2,463 1,094 61 356 135 221 514 499 40.82 38.54 
125 A2 2,612 2,396 1,083 61 349 135 214 473 491 41.46 39.13 
126 A2 2,516 2,300 1,083 61 349 135 214 377 491 43.04 40.62 
127 A1 2,782 2,566 1,092 61 356 135 221 619 499 39.25 37.06 
 
